Is morality objective? This question has enticed and frustrated many philosophers over the centuries. Many in the tradition of Western Religions insist that morality must be objective for it to be authoritative and useful. Many have also argued that for objective morals to exist, God must exist. So whether morality is objective seems important for religious people. On the other hand, those more secular minded also need to understand the nature of morals. If all we have are ourselves, we will need to govern ourselves, and so it is essential for us to know if some principles are, whether we like it or not, objectively true. Given this, there is no shortage of arguments for morality being objective, and just as many arguments exist for why it is subjective. In this essay, I want to present a sort of probabilistic/abductive argument for morality being subjective. I will argue that the nature and variety of moral views and “truths” make the most sense, are best explained by, and are more expected if morality is subjective rather than objective.
Important Definitions and Clarifications
As is usually the case, we need to start by defining our terms. The terms “objective” and “subjective” have many usages and meanings. For our purposes, these terms can be used to distinguish between two types of moral theory. An objective moral theory states that moral claims can be true or false and that the truth or falsity of the claim is grounded by stance-independent reasons. This basically means that moral claims are true or false regardless of what anyone thinks or anyone’s values or preferences are. Conversely, a subjective moral theory posits that moral claims are true or false but on the basis of some stance or perspective that we adopt.
Take, for example, the difference between saying a piece of cake is brown vs delicious. We have two claims: 1) This piece of cake is brown, and 2) This piece of cake is delicious. The first claim is objectively true or false. It does not matter what stance we adopt or the preferences a person has; the colour of the cake is determined by the molecules that make up the cake and the electrons that are reflected off of it. Any person should be able to observe and appreciate the fact of the cake’s colour, given that the colour is determined by the constituents of the cake itself. But now take the taste of the cake, this seems clearly subjective. I think it still makes sense to say it is true or false that the cake is delicious, but the truth or falsity is going to depend on the person’s preferences while making the claim. Of course the constituents of the cake are still an important factor in the equation since they are the things interacting with the person’s preferences. But nonetheless, remove the person’s preferences and you remove the basis for saying the cake is delicious or not. Notice also that this is not merely an opinion in the sense that the agent can arbitrarily change their mind about what they find delicious or not. They will find delicious exactly those things that, by their nature and interaction with the agent’s preferences, are delicious.
Now that we have an understanding of what I mean by objective and subjective, I can explain the “facts” and “phenomena” that I think need to be explained by any competent moral theory. But before getting to that, I want to be clear about the sort of argument I’m making. As expressed in the intro, I want to make an argument of the form: e is evidence for p because e is more expected given the truth of p than if p were false. Not only this, but p best explains e by making the least number of assumptions (as compared to other explanations). This means p is true because it best explains e.
A simple example of this sort of argument is inferring your house is on fire given that the inside is glowing, it is surrounded by heat, and smoke is coming out of every opening. We can reach this conclusion because the glow, heat, and smoke would not be expected if the house were not on fire or if it were completely flooded by water. The evidence is expected if the house were on fire. Of course, the same evidence is expected if someone places a large light, heater, and smoke machine in your house. But this explanation requires that you assume additional facts not in evidence (someone was in your house, wanted to fool or trick you, and had all the means to do so). In contrast, the fire explanation only requires that you assume something completely mundane (that houses can catch fire). What we find then is that e (the glow, heat, and smoke) are most expected and best explained by p (a fire in your house).
With all that preamble out of the way, I can present my argument.
Grounding Normative Force
One aim of any moral theory is to give an account of normativity, or where “oughts” come from. Basically, usually, when people say something “ought” to be the case, that claim is meant to carry some normative force with it. Stating a moral claim and appreciating it is supposed to motivate the agent in such a way that they bring about the “ought” or judge something as good or bad. So, any plausible moral theory will need to give an account of where this normative force comes from (how we get an “ought” from what “is”).
I contend that the only way to get normative force or to get an ought from an is, is via intentionality and decision-making – that is, our psychology. The “ought” comes from what can formally be called the practical syllogism:
- I want X – the teleological premise
- X is brought about through Y – the practical premise
- I can do Y – the possibility premise
- I ought to do what I can to bring about what I want – the pragmatic premise
- Therefore, I ought to do Y – the moral conclusion
Of course, this only gives us a rather mundane sense of ought. The argument, without the proper content, also gives us direction or drive for all kinds of inconsequential and private matters. The argument can remain in the same form and give us directions regarding what cake to eat or music to listen to. So, for it to be distinctly ethical or moral, the teleological premise must be concerned with a “highest good” or “ultimate aim/end”. Given such an aim, the syllogism provides clear non-arbitrary and significant reasons to do some action for a particular person in a particular situation. Also, the argument is currently expressed as forward-looking but can just as easily be formulated as a backwards-looking judgement of whether something is good or bad.
To be clear, the practical syllogism is not something we formally think through, or that exists in our minds. It is a formal way of presenting how our psychology comes to appreciate certain reasons, and in this case, specifically overarching reasons we see as ultimate or holistic. It is one possible, I think plausible, account of what is going on when we say some moral claim is true and that someone ought to do it. The teleological premise represents our highest values and preferences, the practical and possibility premises represent our estimation of what can be done, and the pragmatic premise is essentially how agents with decision-making capacities need to work – it’s what we do once we have established our options.
At this point you might ask how this is an account of getting an ought from an is. The simplest way I can explain this is by saying that, in this view, moral properties are irreducible psychological states given some set of reasons. In other words, in my view, oughts are a type of is; they are a subset of facts about the world, in this case, facts about the psychological judgements that agents make. In the practical syllogism, I called this the pragmatic premise. Just like with the example of a delicious cake, the fact that an agent ought to do what brings about their aims is simply a fact of agency. Combined with an overarching, non-arbitrary, ultimate aim or goal (the teleological premise), it is a fact about what the agent ought to do. Of course, it is a subjective fact about what the agent ought to do, and so this is firmly a subjective theory of morality.
This is my theory of moral properties and what makes a moral claim true or false. I think this theory provides a good explanation of normative force, but what makes those claims with normative force true or false will, at least partially, depend on the preferences/aims of the agent. This is the first important step in my argument; I need to demonstrate that subjective morality can account for the facts under question; namely, normative force. I believe I have done that. Next, I need to show that it is the best explanation of the nature and variety of our moral experiences.
Accounting for Moral Disagreement
Another aim of a sound moral theory is to “fit” with our experience of the world and the way we actually use moral language. This means that the picture of moral principles and language needs to match how we actually express and use moral principles. If a theory says that something is objectively and universally true, yet we find many instances of such things being judged as false on the same basis as others determine them to be true, then we have some reason to suppose the theory is not a good explanation of what we see.
There are many moral phenomena and practices that I think are best explained by a subjective view of morality. For this discussion, we will focus on only one so I can illustrate the point. It also happens to be the strongest and most decisive, in my estimation.
I think the fact that people disagree so much on what is good and what the foundation or core of morality is is much better explained and expected if morality is a matter of preference. I admit that it is still possible that moral facts could be stance-independent facts, but it is very unexpected, then, that there is so much disagreement. It would be like saying there truly are objective facts about what is and is not delicious, but it is just that people are easily and frequently mistaken about such matters. Maybe, but given our conviction about such things, their seeming internal nature, and the observation that we have agreements on all the facts that are supposedly delicious or not, it seems much more likely that people are not mistaken about what is delicious but rather that deliciousness is a matter of taste. I see moral claims like claims of deliciousness; it seems very unlikely that deliciousness is a property of molecules themselves rather than being our estimation of those properties. This is supported by our experiences of what is and is not delicious because if deliciousness were an objective matter, we would expect to see agreement given that we have the capacity to detect it (presumably our taste buds, in this instance). But if deliciousness is a subjective matter, then it is perfectly expected that we should find people disagreeing.
Final Thoughts
Basically, I think it is pretty obvious that moral disagreements, especially given the nature of those we see in the world, are much more expected if morality is subjective than if it were objective. Furthermore, subjective morality is able to account for all the same facts that objective morality can, including the seeming normative force of moral claims (they are subjectively appreciated reasons to act), the agreement of high-level, somewhat vague values (humans have a shared nature and history), and the many specific ethical disagreements we have (people disagree on the priority of values and the possible means to bring them about). Given all of this, I think morality is most likely subjective.
My theory of morality and normative force is deceptively simple. Yet, it accounts for our strong sense of drive regarding our own moral and ethical principles and the variety of moral intuitions and perspectives, and it does so without needing to make any other dubious or additional assumptions. I certainly think what people ultimately want is pretty much the same. We do share much of our nature, and we all have a shared history. This explains why there might seem to be some agreement of high-level values. But when it comes to the specifics, we frequently differ. Subjective moral values driven and grounded by our natures, preferences, and sentiments make much more sense of all of this. It might not be the view that people want to be true, but to me, it seems by far the most likely.
But what do you think? Are there some phenomena or facts that subjective morality cannot account for? Is there something missing from my account of normative force or my theory of where we get “oughts” from? Do you have an objective theory of morality that can explain normative force and moral disagreement? Is there some flaw in arguing for the most likely explanation? Let me know.
I will include a formal version of the argument for your entertainment and investigation:
P1: Lacking a conclusive explanation for some phenomena, it is wise to accept the theory that best explains the given evidence
P2: A theory best explains some evidence when the evidence is more expected given its truth, and it accounts for all the evidence more parsimoniously than another theory
P3: The normative force and moral disagreement surrounding moral claims is best explained by subjective morality
C: Therefore, it is wise to accept that morality is subjective
Casual Philosophy 
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